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Abstract
By resorting to basic features of topological knot theory we pro-
pose a (classical) cryptographic protocol based on the ‘difficulty’ of
decomposing complex knots generated as connected sums of prime
knots and their mutants. The scheme combines an asymmetric public
key protocol with symmetric private ones and is intrinsecally secure
against quantum eavesdropper attacks.
PACS2008:
89.70.-a (Information and communication theory)
02.10.kn (Knot theory)
03.67Dd (Quantum Cryptography and communication security)
MSC2010:
68QXX (Theory of computing)
57M27 (Invariants of knots and 3-manifolds)
68Q17 (Computational difficulty of problems)
1
1 Introduction
Knots and links (collections of knotted circles), beside being fascinating
mathematical objects, are encoded in the modeling of a number of physi-
cal, chemical and biological systems. In particular it was in the late 1980
that knot theory was recognized to have a deep, unexpected interaction with
quantum field theory [1]. In earlier periods of the history of science, geometry
and physics interacted very strongly at the ‘classical’ level (as in Einstein’s
General Relativity theory), but the main feature of this new, ‘quantum’
connection is the fact that geometry is involved in a global and not purely
local way, i.e. only ‘topological’ features do matter. Over the years math-
ematicians have proposed a number of ‘knot invariants’ aimed to classify
systematically all possible knots. Most of these invariants are polynomial
expressions (in one or two variables) with coefficients in the relative integers.
It was Vaughan Jones in [2] who discovered the most famous polynomial in-
variant, the Jones invariant, and solved the Tait’s conjectures for alternating
knots. In the seminal paper by Edward Witten [1], the Jones polynomial was
actually recognized to be associated with the vacuum expectation value of a
‘Wilson loop operator’ in a quantum Chern–Simons theory (see the rewiews
[3], [4] for comprehensive accounts on these topics).
Seemly far from the above remarks, the search for new algorithmic prob-
lems and techniques which should improve ‘quantum’ with respect to clas-
sical computation is getting more and more challenging in the last decade.
Most quantum algorithms are based on the standard quantum circuit model
[5], and are designed to solve problems which are essentially number the-
oretic such as the Shor’s algorithm [6] (see [7] for a general review on the
basics of quantum algorithms). However, other types of problems, typically
classified in the field of enumerative combinatorics and ubiquitous in many
areas of mathematics and physics, share the feature to be ‘intractable’ in the
framework of classical information theory. In particular the evaluation of the
Jones polynomial has been shown to be #P–hard, namely computationally
intractable in a very strong sense [8]. In this perspective, efficient quantum
algorithms for computing approximately knot invariants (of the Jones’ type
or extensions of it) have been successfully addressed in the last few years
[9], [10, 11, 12], [13] and indeed such problem has been recognized to be
‘universal’ in the quantum complexity class BQP (Bounded error Quantum
Polynomial), namely the hardest problem that a quantum computer can
efficiently handle [14].
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Notwithstanding the improvements outlined above both in field–theoretic
settings and in quantum complexity theory, the basic unsolved problem in
topological knot theory still remains the ‘recognition problem’. Namely, given
two knots, how can we check if they are ‘equivalent’ (in the sense to be for-
malized in the next section). Invariants of (oriented) knots might be useful
to this task, but there exist particular classes of knots –the ‘mutants’ of a
given knot– that cannot be distinguished in principle since by definition all
of them possess the same Jones’ type invariants, a result derived by resorting
to standard tools in combinatorial topology (see e.g. [15]) but recognizable
also in the field–theoretic framework as a property of expectation values of
Wilson loop operators [16].
As is well known, group–based cryptography has became in the last few
years a very fruitful branch of cryptoanalysis [17], [18]. In particular, the
key–agreement protocol proposed in [19] can be implemented using the braid
group Bn (a non–Abelian group on (n-1) generators that can be associated to
geometric configurations of n interlaced strands whose endpoints are fixed on
two parallel straight lines in the plane). Knots and braids are indeed closely
interconnected since we can get a (multi–component) knot by ‘closing’ up
an open braid, and a number of interesting algorithmic problems related to
this group can be addressed [20]. Roughly speaking, a braid–group–based
cryptographic protocol relies on the existence of an ‘easy’ problem (recognize
whether two braidsW andW ′, expressed algebraically in terms of generators
of the braid group, are the same element) and an ‘intractable’ one (recognize
whether two words W1 and W2 are conjugate to each other, namely if there
exists a W ′ for which W2 = W
′W1(W
′)−1). As reviewed in [17], basic in-
gredients for implementing secure cryptosystem are the computational time
required to execute the protocol, the number of bits that are to be exchanged
between Alice and Bob, the number of passes (exchange of information), the
sizes of keys and the sizes of system parameters. However modern security is
often much more demanding, so that at present braid–group–based protocols
[19, 21] do not seem safe from eavesdropper attacks.
The theoretically secure protocol we propose in this paper is framed
within topological knot theory and the basic ingredients are ‘prime’ knots
depicted in a standardized manner in Knot Tables currently available on the
web. The scheme relies on the ‘easy’ problem of associating with prime knots
in Knot Tables their Dowker–Thistlethwaite codes, numerical sequences which
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are different for inequivalent knots. Then we resort to the ‘difficulty’ of fac-
torizing, so to speak, complex knots generated by composing prime knots
and their mutants. The scheme resorts to purely classical cryptographic
tools, combining an asymmetric public key protocol with symmetric private
ones.
The adjective ‘post quantum’ in the title comes about a posteriori in light
of the fact that most currently popular public–key cryptosystems rely on the
integer factorization problem or discrete logarithm problem (arising e.g. in
the framework of cyclic group–based protocols), both of which would be easily
solvable on large enough quantum computers using Shor’s algorithm. Our
protocol is not based on the quoted two problems, neither seems reducible
to them, and thus the standard meaning of post–quantum –secure against
‘quantum’ attacks– can be taken for granted until someone will be able to
prove the converse. In a somehow extended sense, and according to the
remarks made above on quantum algorithms for computing knot invariants,
an attack based on (quantum) calculations of such polynomials would fail in
view of the presence of mutants, not detectable even by a quantum computer.
In section 2 we review in brief some basic notions in topological knot
theory, while in section 3 the cryptographic protocol is presented. A few
more comments and conclusions are collected in section 4.
2 Overview of Topological Knot Theory
and coding of knot diagrams
A knot K is defined as a continuous embedding of the circle S1 (the 1–
dimensional sphere) into the Euclidean 3–space R3 or, equivalently, into the
3–sphere S3
.
= R3 ∪ {∞}. A link L is the embedding of the disjoint union of
M circles, ∪Mm=1 (S
1)m into R
3 or S3, namely a finite collection of knots. Since
each circle can be naturally endowed with an orientation, we can introduce
naturally oriented knots (links).
Referring for simplicity to the unoriented case, two knots K1 and K2 are
said to be equivalent, K1 ∼ K2, if and only if they are (ambient) isotopic.
An isotopy can be thought of as a continuous deformation of the shape of,
say, K2 ⊂ R
3 which makes K2 identical to K1 without cutting and gluing
back the ‘closed string’ K2.
The planar diagram, or simply the diagram, of a knot K is the projection
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of K on a plane R2 ⊂ R3, in such a way that no point belongs to the
projection of three segments, namely the singular points in the diagram are
only transverse double points. Such a projection, together with ‘over’ and
‘under’ information at the crossing points –depicted in figures by breaks in
the under–passing segments– is denoted by D(K). In what follows we shall
identify the symbols K with D(K), although we can obviously associate with
a same knot an infinity of planar diagrams.
The number of crossings of a knot (diagram) is clearly a good indicator of
the ‘complexity’ of the knot and indeed Tait in late 1800 initiated a program
aimed to classifying systematically knots in terms of the number of crossings.
In Knots Tables (see [22] and the Knot Atlas on Wikipedia) there appear di-
agrams of unoriented ‘prime’ knots listed by increasing crossing numbers as
̥N , where ̥ is the number of crossings and N = 1, 2, . . . enumerates in a
conventional way the (standard projections of) knots with the same ̥. The
(unique) ‘unknot’ or trivial knot K© has standard projection given by the
circle, i.e. ̥N (K©) = 0 with N = 1. A prime knot is defined as a non–trivial
knot which cannot be decomposed into two (or more) non–trivial knots. De-
composition is in turn the inverse of the topological operation of composition
of knot diagrams. More precisely, given two knot diagrams K1 and K2, it is
possible to draw a new knot by removing a small segment from each knot
and then joining the four endpoints by two new arcs. The resulting diagram
is the connected sum of K1, K2, denoted by K1 # K2. As shown below,
starting for instance from the diagrams of the trefoil knot K1 (configuration
31 in Knot Tables) and its mirror image K2, their connected sum turns out
to be the so–called ‘square’ knot, the six–crossings configuration listed as 62.
K1 K2
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K1 #K2
The connected sum of knot diagrams (well defined for oriented knots) is
commutative and associative and has an identity element given by the trivial
knot K©, namely K© # K = K for each K. Remarkably, to each diagram
representing a composite knot it is possible to associate a decomposition into
prime knots which is unique [23] –up to ordering of summands. The (mini-
mal) crossing number used for building up Knot Tables is the first example
of a numerical knot ‘invariant’ since it depends only on the ambient isotopy
class of the knot. Switching to knot (link) diagrams, it can be proved that
a knot invariant is a quantity (a number or a polynomial, see below) which
does not change under applications to the diagrams of finite sequences of
the so–called Reidemeister moves (we leave aside this issue and refer to the
classic books [24, 15, 25, 26] also as general references on knot invariants).
It is not difficult to recognize that polynomial invariants can take the same
value on inequivalent knots, and it is the biggest open problem in knot the-
ory to establish a ‘complete’ set of invariants able to distinguish (and thus
classify) all equivalence classes of knots. Most famous polynomial invariants
of knots, such as Alexander polynomial, Jones polynomial [2] and its exten-
sions [27] (in one formal variable) as well as HOMFLY [28] and Kauffman
[25] polynomials (in two variables) are able to distinguish particular sub–
classes or types of knots. Actually, even resorting to all of them, there exists
quite a large number of examples (with relatively small crossing numbers) in
which indistinguishable diagrams still remain. In particular, neither Jones,
Kauffman and HOMFLY polynomials, nor more general invariants such as
Reshetikhin–Turaev ones, are sufficient to distinguish any knot K from its
mutations K ′ [15, 16].
To explain what is a ‘mutant’ knot we introduce first a ‘tangle’ notation
for dealing with knot diagrams. A tangle is defined as a region of the planar
diagram of an oriented or unoriented knot bounded by a circle (not belonging
to the diagram) such that the knot strands cross the circle exactly four times.
Thus any knot can be always presented by resorting to (at least) two tangles,
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say S and R, joined by 2+2 strands (this shorthand graphical notation for a
single knot should not be confused with the operation of connected sum on
knot diagrams).
S
R
Starting from a tangle presentation of an oriented knot K, a mutant K ′
arises by removing, e.g., the tangle labeled by R (two strands ingoing and
two outgoing) and replacing it with a tangle R′ obtained by rotating R (and
reversing orientation of some strands if necessary). Admissible rotations are
depicted below: the inner content of the tangle undergos pi–rotations with
respect to three mutually orthogonal axes which can be thought as pointing
from the central configuration toward the other three embedded in a reference
3–space. Note that only two of these rotations are independent, but of course
the process of mutation can be carried out at will on different subsets of a
same knot diagram including at least one crossing.
R
R
R
R
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In view of applications in cryptography we conclude this section by intro-
ducing Dowker–Thistlethwaite (DT) notation (or code) for oriented knots.
This allows us to associated to each planar diagram its (minimal) DT se-
quence (actually a string of relative integers) from which it is possible to
reconstruct (almost) uniquely the knot. Consider as an example an oriented
alternating knot with n crossings (namely a diagram with an alternating se-
quence of over and under–crossings) and start labeling an arbitrary crossing
with 1. Once fixed an orientation, go down the strand to the next crossing
and denote it by 2. Continue around the knot until each crossing has been
numbered twice. Then each crossing is decorated with a pair of even/odd
positive numbers, running from 1 to 2n, as shown below for the knot 51.
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For prime alternating knots the notation uniquely defines a single knot in
case of amphichiral knots or corresponds to a single knot or its mirror im-
age in case of chiral ones. (Recall that a chiral knot is a knot that is not
equivalent to its mirror image while an oriented knot that is equivalent to
its mirror image is an amphichiral knot). For generic, non–alternating prime
knots (which actually appear in tables for crossing numbers greater than 7),
the Dowker–Thistlethwaite coding is slightly modified by making the sign of
the even numbers positive if the crossing is on the top strand, and negative
if it is on the bottom strand. Since any Dowker sequence is dependent on
both a minimal projection and the choice of a starting point, the mapping
between knots and their DT sequences is one–to–many, so it would be nec-
essary to find a minimal DT sequence for each (composite) knot. Hence DT
codes are to be interpreted as minimal permutations of strings of relative
integers representing certain knot diagrams, not carrying significant topolog-
ical information about knots (so that they are useless in any attempt of knot
classification).
Summing up, the assignment of Dowker–Thistlethwaite codes to prime
knots enumerated in currently available Knot Tables (up to 17 crossings) is
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essentially unique and the length of these numerical strings (plus possibly ±
signs) grows linearly with the crossing number.
3 Cryptography using knots
Let us remind some basics facts about RSA cryptosystem, the most famous
protocol of all times invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [29] and based
on the concept of ‘asymmetric’ public key. Imagine that A (Alice) must send
a secret message to B (Bob). It would take the following steps:
1. B generates a public key χ by resorting to a certain set of ‘generators’.
2. B sends the public key to A. Anyone can see it.
3. A uses the key to encrypt the message M;
4. A sends the encrypted message Mχ to B, but none can decrypt it.
5. B receives the message Mχ and, knowing the generators, is able to
decrypt it.
Actually most RSA–type protocols are based on the computational com-
plexity of factorization of prime numbers, because the generators are two
large prime numbers (p and q) and the public key is the product of them
(N = pq). Once given N, decrypting the message needs the knowledge of its
prime factors, and this is of course a computationally hard problem. Note
however that public key algorithms are very costly in terms of computational
resources. The time it takes the message to be encoded and decoded is rel-
atively high and this is actually the main drawback of (any) asymmetric
decoding. This problem can be overcome or even solved by using a symmet-
ric key together with the asymmetric one, as we are going to illustrate in the
following statements defining our knot–based cryptosystem.
A must send a secret message to B and they share the same finite list
of prime knots K’s. The message M will be built by resorting to a finite
sequence of (not necessarily prime) knots L1, ..., LN as described below
step I) Through a standard RSA protocol, B sends to A an ordered sublist of
N prime knots (taken from current available Knot Tables) K1, ..., KN ,
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together with mutation instructions to be applied to each Ki (also no
mutation on some of them is allowed). Then a second list K ′1, ..., K
′
N
is generated by picking up definite mutations of the original sequence.
step II) A takes K ′1, ..., K
′
N and performs a series of ordered connected sums
L1#K
′
1, L2#K
′
2, . . . , LN#K
′
N
with the knots L1, ..., LN associated with the message to be sent.
These composite knots are now translated (efficiently) into Dowker–
Thistlethwaite sequences and sent to B. Obviously at this stage every-
one has access to these strings of relative integers.
step III) B receives the (string of) composite knots. Since he knows the DT
sub–codes for the prime knots of the shared list, he can decompose the
composite knots, thus obtaining the DT code for every Li. Then the
planar diagrams of L1, ..., LN can be uniquely recovered.
Basically we are using in the protocol both a public key (step I) and a
private key (step II). In fact the message is encrypted (by A) and decrypted
(by B) using the same key, the sequence of prime knots that they share (se-
cretly) thanks to step I.
4 Discussion and conclusions
There are a number of advantages in basing a cryptosystem on complex ge-
ometric structures such as knots, where the selected prime knots could be
looked at as providing an encryption alphabet. Note first that the coding pro-
cedure that provides the Dowker–Thistlethwaite string (e.g. written in the
standard binary notation) is efficiently implementable since it grows linearly
with the crossing number. As noted above, decomposing a composite knot in
its prime components is at least as difficult as finding the prime factors of a
large number, while of course the composition (corresponding to multiplying
integers) is an easy task. In order to attack such kind of protocol, one might
resort to two strategies.
• The first approach is based on the use of topological invariants which
provide, at least in case of low crossing numbers, quite a lot of information.
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Looking at Knot Tables we note that, up to seven crossings, all knots are
alternating, so that, in particular, the crossing number of a knot built as
a connected sum of alternating knots is the sum of the individual crossing
numbers (but this is not true for non–alternating knots). On the other hand,
most powerful knot polynomials (quoted in section 2) are multiplicative with
respect to connected sums. So, for instance, we can evaluate [25] the Jones
invariant JK(t) of a given composite knot K getting a (Laurent) polynomial
in the formal variable t, but still it is a hard task to extract the polynomials
associated with the prime factors of K. As a matter of fact, such a strategy
based on knot invariants is effectively unfeasible because topological invari-
ants of polynomial type are not able to distinguish a (generic) knot from one
of its mutations.
• Another way is to try to decompose the knot diagram containing the
message by resorting to iterated combinatorial operations aimed to recognize
in the encrypted message L1#K
′
1, L2#K
′
2, . . . , LN#K
′
N at least some of the
prime knots in the public list. But there exists no known algorithm to ad-
dress the decomposition problem of a generic knot into its prime components.
Finally, as pointed out in section 2, it is certainly true that the recognition
problem can be associated with combinatorially recursive procedures, but
Haken [30] was able to prove only the existence of an algorithm running in
exponential time. On the other hand, the unknotting problem [31] –a partic-
ular case of the recognition problem stated in term of comparison of a given
knot K with the unknot K©– is shown to belong to the complexity class NP
[32, 33].
The new knot–based cryptographic protocol proposed in this paper re-
lies on quite simple mathematical notions and needs of course to be further
specified and checked against different types of attacks. Note however that
techniques developed within the framework of braid group–based cryptogra-
phy (see [17], section 4) do not seem to be implementable in such a purely
topological setting1.
1 It is worth recalling that the set of (prime) knots equipped with connected sum #
is an Abelian semigroup (actually a monoid, the unknot being the identity element). On
the other hand, closed braids representative of a given knot diagram exist, but they are
certainly not unique. Actually the problem of finding out the ‘minimal’ braid index for a
knot K –namely the minimum number n such that there exists a braid W ∈ Bn whose
closure reproduces K– is again a hard problem, cfr. section 4 of [20]. Then the knot–based
protocol is not effectively reducible to the group–based approach to classical cryptography.
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In conclusion, it seems quite promising that, besides brute force attacks
which would be exponential resources consuming as the topological com-
plexity of the knots grows, more sophisticated attacks based on (exact or
approximate, classical or quantum) calculations of polynomial invariants of
knots are intrinsically unreliable.
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